What makes something theological

However, we should work to become aware of the power and importance of the words we use to describe God. These resources are a great place to start! Do you prefer systematic or biblical theology? Why or why not? Let us know in the comments! Systematic theology, please! I want the big — picture view of each topic so as to better understand where each piece of scripture fits into that picture.

I had started a study of systematic theology many years ago with our pastor, but never got an explanation of why or what it was only that he wanted to teach a class to refresh his own grasp of it. I thought it was 3 thick volumes of unpronounceable words and meanings. I never got gist of it and dropped out. I prefer the simple Bible as it is written. I need nothing more.. One should not add large unpronounceable words and make something more difficult for non theologian people like me.

Keep it simple. Systematic theology is of the most interest because it gets me the the focus of the Bible. I get to know the central themes in the Bible. And if there is a conflict the scientist needs to go back and re-evaluate his positions or the theologian needs to go back and examine his teaching.

I prefer the systematic theological process over the biblical theological process in times when I am looking for a particular answer to that which I am going through at that particular time. On the other hand, I prefer the biblical process over the systematic at other times when I just want to learn and spend time with our Lord at his feet!

By default, I defer to systematic theology. The former is about principles; the latter, application. I need both. Because I use hermeneutics in my studies, I find biblical theology more rewarding for my understanding of Scripture. When looking at discoveries made in systematic theology I still need hermeneutics to correctly exegete the passage and understand if the conclusions they made are correct.

Knowing the theology of a particular book will reveal this. This is off topic but concerning hermeneutics I recommend green Osbournes hermeneutical spiral. I studied the main highways and streets and became familiar with how they connected and intersected; I learned the neighborhoods and the easiest ways in and out.

After that, I found the addresses of stores and attractions that were of special interest to me; then I marked the addresses of all the kids that were in my youth group I was brought in as youth pastor , my favorite restaurants, particularly those that delivered.

Then, over the first few weeks, I drove to as many of those places as I could, using the map routes that I had laid out in my mind, watching closely for businesses and other landmarks to help me familiarize my routes. After a few weeks, I had kids who wondered how I navigated the entire area like I had lived there all my life.

This is analogous to the study of theology: I really need to learn what the Bible, in its entirety, teaches about the themes that run through it from Genesis to Revelation. I believe that most error comes from people reading and interpreting a verse or passage divorced from the total context of Scripture.

While that might not satisfy my mind in clear and confidant certainty of the understanding of my passage, it will most likely keep me from falling into error.

Thank you for putting a name to this method. By incorporating cultural background resources and original languages, led by the Holy Spirit, my study is so rich. Your method sounds thorough and could streamline my efforts. I mean, it requires a decision not to use them. Hey, Clarice! In the app, you can use any translation with study notes. Hope this helps! I like systematic theology because when you study a particular characteristic of God; e. Seeing this throughout enhances the specific trait of God in your studies.

The process I felt led to use when the Lord would give me something to study, e. Sounds like a systematic approach. Then I would ask the Lord for specific direction to an event in Scripture that He wanted me to use to develop a theme He wanted to highlight. I could also show where God used that meaning in other settings expanding its meaning for us. At times, after many hours of research, I would go before the Lord and ask Him how I was to present the theme, and He would turn me to another approach entirely.

There is a need for clarification here. Your bucket illustration is amazingly good by the way. Your established thought buckets are in place first — said another way: You first have a system of thinking in terms of categories to place bible verses into. The bible verse fits into their established systematic theology.

A Biblical Theologian will not first have a systematic bucket to put the text in but ask first: What did this text mean when it was written, what was within the culture that made this concept important to the writer in that day; what was the writers style or personal experience in the issue, with the recipients etc. These things are not systematic theology categories and may not even speak to a specific Systematic bucket. A biblical Theologian thinks of the text and its context first and maybe come up with other things to talk about than the pre-established buckets.

Biblical Themes are not Systematic categories. You have to remember that Grudem is a very conservative Bible First systematic theologian so for him to do Systematics as a Conservative Evangelical, he must use the text to fill the systematics buckets but he has his buckets established first, and sees the text speaking to them — arguing for his Systematic positions. Even God might not so easily fit within our systematic constructs.

I see not one scripture reference to systemising scripture. However, here is scripture to support interpretation through biblical revolation. Thank you so much for this! I prefer the biblical-theological study. When I study systematically, I most times have the tendency to not find my way back to the beginning, sort speak. In addition to his moral philosophy , Thomas Aquinas is well-known for his theological writings.

He is arguably the most eminent philosophical theologian ever to have lived. Although his work is not limited to illuminating Christian doctrine, virtually all of what he wrote is shaped by his theology. Therefore it seems appropriate to consider some of the theological themes and ideas that figure prominently in his thought. Although Aquinas does not think that philosophical reasoning can provide an exhaustive account of the divine nature, it is he insists both a source of divine truth and an aid in exonerating the intellectual credibility of those doctrines at the heart of the Christian faith.

From this perspective, philosophical reasoning can be to use a common phrase a tool in the service of theology. Finally, we will consider how Aquinas employs philosophical reasoning when explaining and defending two central Christian doctrines: the Incarnation and the Trinity.

How can we know realities of a divine nature? First, we may come to know things about God through rational demonstration. Reasoning of this sort will enable us to know, for example, that God exists. He does think, however, that human reasoning can illuminate some of what the Christian faith professes SCG 1. Those aspects of the divine life which reason can demonstrate comprise what is called natural theology , a subject we will address in section 2.

Obviously, some truths about God surpass what reason can demonstrate. Our knowledge of them will therefore require a different source of divine truth, namely, sacred teaching. According to Aquinas, sacred teaching contains the most complete and reliable account of what we profess about God SCG I.

How, then, can we be confident that sacred teaching is, in fact, a reliable source of divine knowledge? An extended treatment of this matter requires that we consider the role faith plays in endorsing what sacred teaching proposes for belief. This issue is addressed in section 3. The conclusions of NT do not rely on supernaturally revealed truths; its point of departure is that which can be ascertained by means of the senses or rational methods of investigation. So understood, NT is primarily a philosophical enterprise.

The first article of ST makes this clear. There, he asks whether knowledge of God requires something more than what philosophical investigation is able to tell us ST Ia 1. His answer is yes : although natural human reason can tell us quite a bit about God, it cannot give us salvific knowledge. But before he turns to them, he addresses several objections to making God an object of demonstration.

This essay will consider two of those objections. For Aquinas, this objection rests on a confusion about what it means for a statement to be self-evident. He explains: a statement is self-evident if its predicate is contained in the essence of the subject ST Ia 2.

Anyone who knows what a triangle is will see that this statement is axiomatic; it needs no demonstration. On the other hand, this statement will not appear self-evident to those who do not know what a triangle is. ST Ia 2. For a statement is self-evident in itself so long as it accurately predicates of the subject-term the essential characteristics it has.

Whether a statement is self-evident to us , however, will depend on whether we understand the subject-term to have those characteristics. Indeed, it is unlikely that even those acquainted with the idea of God will, upon reflecting on the idea, understand that existence is something that God has necessarily.

Although Aquinas does not deny that knowledge of God is naturally implanted in us, such knowledge is, at best, inchoate and imprecise; it does not convey absolutely that God exists ST Ia 2. We will consider one of these demonstrations below. The assent of faith involves embracing doctrinal teachings about God, whose existence is already assumed. Thus for some people it is perfectly appropriate to accept on the basis of sacred teaching that which others attempt to demonstrate by means of reason ST Ia 2.

In the Summa Theologiae Ia 2. Each demonstration proceeds roughly as follows: Aquinas identifies some observable phenomenon and then attempts to show that, necessarily, the cause of that phenomenon is none other than God. The phenomena Aquinas cites in these demonstrations include: 1 motion; 2 the existence of efficient causes; 3 the reality of contingency; 4 the different grades of perfection in the natural order; and 5 the end-directed activity of natural objects.

We should note that these demonstrations are highly abridged versions of arguments he addresses at length elsewhere most notably, SCG I. Constraints of space do not permit an explication of each argument. But it will be helpful to consider at least one argument in order to see how these demonstrations typically proceed.

The argument is as follows:. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known neither is it, indeed, possible in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate [cause] is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.

Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God ST Ia 2.

First premise. Note here that there is no need to prove this premise. Its truth is manifestly obvious, and thus Aquinas employs it as an argumentative point of departure. Second premise. Aquinas then claims that it is impossible for any being to be the efficient cause of itself.

Why is self-causation impossible? For the sake of ease, consider what it would mean for something to be the cause of its own existence although this is not the only form of self-causation Aquinas has in mind. In order to bring about the existence of anything, one needs a certain amount of causal power. Yet a thing cannot have causal power unless it exists. But if something were to be the cause of itself —that is, if it were to bring about its own existence—it would have to exist prior to itself, which is impossible ST Ia 2.

Hence the third premise : every efficient cause must have a prior cause. There, he says that to be in motion is to move from potentiality to actuality. When something moves, it goes from having the ability to move to the activity of moving. Yet something cannot be the source of its own movement. His interest, rather, is the existence of a causal order —one consisting of substances whose existence and activity depend on prior causes of that same order Wippel, If every constituent member of that order is causally dependent on something prior to itself, then it appears that the order in question must consist of an infinite chain of causes.

Yet Aquinas denies this implication fourth premise : if the causal order is infinite, then obviously there could be no first cause. But without a first cause, then necessarily there could be no subsequent effects—including the intermediate efficient causes and ultimate effect ST Ia 2. In other words, the absence of a first cause would imply an absence of the causal order we observe. A few clarifications about this argument are in order.

First, commentators stress that this argument does not purport to show that the world is constituted by a temporal succession of causes that necessarily had a beginning see for example Copleston, Interestingly, Aquinas himself denies that the argument from efficient causality contradicts the eternality of the world ST Ia Whether the world began to exist can only be resolved, he thinks, by appealing to sacred teaching.

An illustration may help clarify the sort of argument Aquinas wishes to present. The proper growth of, say, plant life depends on the presence of sunlight and water. The presence of sunlight and water depends on ideal atmospheric activities. And those atmospheric activities are themselves governed by more fundamental causes, and so forth.

In this example, the events described proceed not sequentially, but concurrently. Even so, they constitute an arrangement in which each event depends for its occurrence on causally prior events or phenomena. According to Copleston, illustrations of this sort capture the kind of causal ordering that interests Aquinas. Thus we might explain the sort of ordering that interests Aquinas as a metaphysical as opposed to a temporal ordering of causes. For, as we have already seen, the absence of a first cause would imply the absence of subsequent causes and effects.

Unless we invoke a cause that itself transcends the ordering of dependent causes, we would find it difficult to account for the causal activities we presently observe. Yet Aquinas does not attempt to show through the previous argument that the demonstrated cause has any of the qualities traditionally predicated of the divine essence.

In other words, the term God— at least as it appears in ST Ia 2. In the case of the second way, God is synonymous with the first efficient cause; it does not denote anything of theological substance. For the study of what God is must be subsequent to demonstrating that he is. A complete account of the divine nature requires a more extensive examination, which he undertakes in the subsequent articles of ST. Such an investigation poses unique challenges. Aquinas therefore does not presume to say explicitly or directly what God is.

Instead, he investigates divine nature by determining what God is not. He does this by denying of God those properties that are conceptually at odds with what is already concluded by means of the five ways ST Ia 3 prologue; Cf. SCG I. Aquinas acknowledges a potential worry for his view. If the method by which we investigate God is one of strict remotion, then no divine predicate can describe what God is really like.

For Aquinas, however, the terms we predicate of God can function positively, even if they cannot capture perfectly or make explicit the divine nature. As we have discussed, natural knowledge of God is mediated by our knowledge of the created order. The observable facts of that order reveal an efficient cause that is itself uncaused—a self-subsisting first mover that is uncreated and is not subject to any change.

But as the ultimate cause of our own existence, God is said to have all the perfections of his creatures ST Ia Whatever perfections reside in us must be deficient likenesses of what exists perfectly in God. Consequently, Aquinas thinks that terms such as good and wise can refer back to God.

Moreover, denying certain properties of God can, in fact, give us a corresponding albeit incomplete understanding of what God is like. In other words, the process of articulating what God is not does not yield an account of the divine that is wholly negative.

If this is so, there can be no potency or unrealized potential in God. For if something has the potential or latent capacity to act, then its activity must be precipitated by some prior actuality. But in this line of reasoning, there is no actuality prior to God. It must follow, then, that God is pure actuality, and this in virtue of being the first cause ST Ia 3.

So although this process denies God those traits that are contrary to what we know about him, those denials invariably yield a fairly substantive account of the divine life. Other truths necessarily follow from the idea that God is pure actuality. For example, we know that God cannot be a body. For a characteristic feature of bodies is that they are subject to being moved by something other than themselves.

And because God is not a body, he cannot be a composite of material parts ST Ia 3. Not only does Aquinas think that God is not a material composite, he also insists that God is not a metaphysical composite Vallencia, In other words, God is not an amalgam of attributes, nor is he a being whose nature or essence can be distinguished from his existence.

He is, rather, a simple being. But the following account should provide the reader with a rough sketch of what this doctrine involves. Consider the example human being. Of course, a human being is also material being.

In virtue of materiality, she possesses numerous individuating accidents. These would include various physical modifications such as her height or weight, her particular skin pigmentation, her set of bones, and so forth. According to Aquinas, none of these accidental traits are included in her humanity indeed, she could lose these traits, acquire others, and remain a human being. They do, however, constitute the particular human being she is. In other words, her individuating accidents do not make her human, but they do make her a particular exemplification of humanity.

This is why it would be incorrect to say that this person is identical to her humanity; instead, the individuating accidents she has make her one of many instances thereof.

But what about substances that are not composed of matter? Such things cannot have multiple instantiations since there is no matter to individuate them into discrete instances of a specific nature or essence. An immaterial substance then will not instantiate its nature. Instead, the substance will be identical to its nature. This is why Aquinas insists that there can be no distinction between 1 God and 2 that by which he is God.

For example, we often say that God is supremely good. Presumably we can say the same about his knowledge, perfection, wisdom, and other essential attributes routinely predicated of him. Examples of theology in a Sentence He has an interest in theology and pastoral work. The bishop was opposed to the group's theology.

Recent Examples on the Web Thiel has a more esoteric intellectual identity, which draws on anthropology, political theory, and theology. First Known Use of theology 14th century, in the meaning defined at sense 1. Learn More About theology.

Time Traveler for theology The first known use of theology was in the 14th century See more words from the same century. Style: MLA. English Language Learners Definition of theology. Kids Definition of theology. Get Word of the Day daily email! Test Your Vocabulary. Can you spell these 10 commonly misspelled words?